The Italian Way of War

From Garibaldi to Operation Husky 1866–1943

English-language historiography traditionally disregards Italian military history with generalizations about ineptitude, cowardice, and an ethnic/cultural aversion to warfare. This book synthesizes previous scholarship with original research to provide a balanced narrative and assessment of Italian military history from 1866 to 1943.

English-language historiography traditionally disregards Italian military history with sweeping generalizations about ineptitude, cowardice, and an ethnic/cultural aversion to warfare. This dismissive and demeaning approach obscures thoughtful analysis and discourse on the strengths, weaknesses, and ways in which Italy’s military history is not dissimilar from other nations. Italy experienced two anti-insurgent operations, two conventional wars against European powers, a civil war, and two colonial campaigns during its first fifty years as a nation. These encounters forced versatility. Italy entered World War One as a young nation with a fledgling industry and limited raw materials. Nevertheless, it progressed along the tactical learning curve of modern industrial warfare like other belligerents. The country’s strategic aspirations in World War Two, like those of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, exceeded its war-making capabilities. The Italian Way of War synthesizes previous scholarship with original research to provide a balanced narrative and assessment of Italian military history from 1866 to 1943.